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Hedrick v. Commonwealth
Nos. 98-2055, 98-2056, 1999 WL 101079
(Va. Feb. 26, 1999)
I. Facts
On the evening of May 10, 1997, Brandon Wayne Hedrick ("Hedrick")
and a companion, Trevor Jones ("Jones"), observed the victim, Lisa Yvonne
Alexander Crider ("Crider"), walking along the roadside.' Jones informed
the defendant that he believed Crider's boyfriend was a seller of crack
cocaine. Hedrick and Jones determined that Crider probably had crack in
her possession and decided to rob her and have sexual relations with her.2
The three went to Jones's apartment where Jones and Hedrick "devised a
plan in which Hedrick would pretend to rob both Jones and Crider."3
Hedrick, with a shotgun in his hands, ordered Jones to empty Crider's
pockets and put handcuffs on her. Jones pulled $50, cigarettes, and a ciga-
rette lighter out of Crider's pockets, handcuffed her, taped her eyes and
mouth with the duct tape and put a shirt over her head.4
The three then left the apartment in Jones's truck. While in the truck,
Hedrick raped Crider.' Hedrick and Jones then discussed killing Crider and
decided to do so. In an effort to save her life, Crider performed oral sodomy
on Hedrick.6
Jones drove the truck to a back road by the James River.! Jones pulled
off the road and Hedrick exited the passenger side of the truck with the
shotgun. Jones then removed the handcuffs and rebound her hands, eyes
and mouth with duct tape while Hedrick watched. Jones led Crider to the
riverbank and turned to Hedrick and said, "do what you got to do."' At
this point Jones began walking away. As he did so, he heard a single gun-
shot.
1. Hedrick v. Commonwealth, Nos. 98-2205, 98-2056, 1999 WL 101079, at *2 (Va.
Feb. 26, 1999).









At trial, the Commonwealth's witnesses testified that several examina-
tions revealed that Crider had been shot in the face with a shotgun. The
shotgun wad was found deep in the cranial cavity indicating that the gun
was fired from close range. 0
Hedrick was indicted for capital murder in the commission of a rob-
bery, forcible sodomy, and rape.' The jury found Hedrick guilty of capital
murder. At the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the jury sentenced
Hedrick to death on a "finding that he represented a serious threat to society
and that his offence was outrageously wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the
victim." 2
II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia found no reversible error in the trial
court's decision and affirmed the judgment. 3
IIL Analysis /Application in Virginia
Hedrick raised several claims on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia. 4 The only claim requiring discussion and analysis is the conten-
tion that, since Hedrick caused the death of Crider with a single gunshot,
the murder could not be "vile" as a matter of law.'" The lengths to which
the Supreme Court of Virginia was forced to go in order to escape the
dictates of Godfrey v. Georgia,6 and its progeny are instructive. Read
10. I, at *4
11. Ia, at *1.
12. Id
13. Id, at *10.
14. Id., at *5-9. Many of Hedrick's claims were denied in a cursory fashion by reference
to prior decisions. For that reason they will not be discussed in detail in this summary.
These claims include: (1) failure of the trial court to allow for a jury questionnaire; (2) denial
of counsel's request for the Commonwealth to provide a bill of particulars; (3) the admittance
into trial evidence of a photo of the victim's face after she was shot in the face with a shotgun
that was both enlarged and duplicative; (4) refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdicts
of the jury finding him guilty of robbery, rape and forcible sodomy as contrary to the law
and the evidence; (5) the trial court's failure to commute the sentence of death to a sentence
of life imprisonment. Id, at *5-6, 8.
The court also determined that the sentence of death was not imposed under an
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and that the sentence of death
was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant. Id, at *9.
15. Id, at *6.
16. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that the Georgia statute dictating the factors of
eligibility for death, which states that the offense be outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman, was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and that such term requires a narrowing construction; the Court declared that the
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together with the courts' pronouncements about the vileness factor found
in Reid v. Commonwealth," and Cherrix v. Commonwealth,8 the Hedrick
opinion reveals that the court continues to apply the factor in an unconstitu-
tional manner and will go to great lengths to continue doing so.
A. The Vileness Aggravator-Aggravated Battery
Virginia's vileness aggravator requires that the conduct of the defendant
in committing the capital murder must "involve[] torture, depravity of mind
or an aggravated battery to the victim." 9 On appeal to the Supreme Courtof Virginia, Hedrick claimed that under Godfrey there could not have been
an aggravated battery as the victim died from a single shotgun wound.0 The
court held that the language of the vileness factor, identical to that of the
Georgia statute in Godfrey, is to be construed disjunctively, meaning that
either torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery will suffice.2' The
court held that aggravated battery, which it defined as conduct "qualitatively
and quantitatively more culpable then the minimum necessary "  to accom-
plish the act of murder, was satisfied because of acts committed by the
defendant before the shooting 3 and indeed before he had even formed the
intent to kill.24
The Supreme Court of Virginia did at least refer, however inaccurately,
to some of the specific evidence presented when it upheld the aggravated
battery finding.2 The court did not reference specific evidence when it
made the additional conclusory observation that the killing involved
torture26 and depravity of mind.7
single shotgun wound in this case did not establish vileness in that it did not involve torture
or depravity of mind and was not aggravated battery).
17. See Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 457 (1999) (analyzing Reid
v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998)).
18. See David D. Leshner, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 419 (1999) (analyzing Cherrix v.
Commonwealth, Nos. 98-1798, 98-2063, 1999 WL 101077 (Va. Feb. 26, 1999)).
19. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998).
20. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *6. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33
(1980).
21. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *7. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422.
22. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *7.
23. Id. "Before the defendant murdered Crider, he had robbed her and raped her,
forced her to perform an act of oral sodomy upon him, bound her hands with duct tape,
covered her eyes and mouth with duct tape, and held her in captivity for five hours." Id.
24. Id, at *2-3. Hedrick's intent to kill was not formed until after he raped her. See
supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
25. Id, at *7.
26. Id. "Hedrick committed an aggravated battery upon Crider and caused her to suffer
physical injury and torture preceding her death." Id.
27. Id "[T]he evidence was overwhelming that the defendant's conduct showed a
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In Hedrick and other cases, the court demonstrates a misunderstanding
of, or indifference to, both the purpose of the aggravating factor and the law
governing its application. Godfrey requires a narrowing construction of the
statutory language because the language of the statute is insufficient.28 The
purpose of the required narrowing construction is to guide the fact finders
so that only the most culpable among murderers are sentenced to death. It
is essential that the narrowing construction be given to the jury or applied
on appeal.
In spite of Godfrey, Virginia has not recognized any need to require
narrowing constructions for the vileness factor in the past.29 However,
some Virginia courts have occasionally applied definitions purporting to
help guide in determining which murders are vile."0 In Virginia, there is no
definition for the torture prong, and the definition for depravity of mind is
as vague as the statutory language itself. 1 The definition for aggravated
battery, however, could have possibly passed constitutional muster had the
court focused on a qualitative increase in personal culpability. Until
Hedrick, the court never focused on increased personal culpability at all. 2
In the past, the court has simply counted stab wounds or gunshot wounds.
In fact, in Reid, the court denied that the factor requires a mental element
of increased culpability. 3 In Hedrick, however, when counting wounds
would not support the aggravating factor, the court simply did a post-hoc
search of the record to identify what it found particularly reprehensible.
Apparently the limiting language of the factor, the "conduct in committing
the offense" was outrageously vile, encompasses as much conduct as is
required to sustain the death sentence.34
depravity of mind." Id.
28. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427-33.
29. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784 (Va. 1979) (holding that a trial court's
refusal to give a narrowing definition of torture, aggravated battery, or depravity of mind was
not reversible error). This holding has not been overruled.
30. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978). Though Virginia has not
acknowledged that narrowing constructions are necessary in response to Godfrey, the court
in Smith applied a narrowing construction of aggravated battery that defined aggravated
battery as quantitatively and qualitatively more culpable than the minimum necessary to
complete the act of murder. 1d., at 149.
31. The court in Smith defined depravity of mind as a degree of moral turpitude and
psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and
premeditation.
32. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at -7.
33. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 793.
34. VA. CODE. ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998). There is little need to discuss the
court's casual observance that the torture and depravity of mind components were satisfied.
The opinion, fairly read, simply holds "it is so because we say it is so."
[Vol. 1 1:2
HEDRICK V COMMONWEALTH
The court's attempt to distinguish Godfrey on its facts is also inade-
quate." In Godfrey, the dissent reminded the majority of the facts of the
case where the petitioner used a shotgun, an instrument "hardly know[n] for
its surgical precision" in killing his first victim, while the second victim
observed and stood waiting for her inevitable fate, and whose "last several
moments . ..must have been as terrifying as the human mind can
imagine. "" The majority in Godfrey determined that this was not vile. 7
The Virginia Supreme Court in Hedrick determined that Godfrey was
factually distinguishable.3 The court stated that "[t]he defendant, an avid
hunter who considered himself skilled with firearms, shot the victim in the
face with the shotgun, as she stood helplessly awaiting her execution at a
distance of three to seven feet from the barrel of the shotgun."39 The court
concluded that "the manner in which the defendant terrorized and killed
Crider was qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than the mini-
mum necessary to accomplish the act of murder."4 This is a less than
honest comparison of the facts in Hedrick to those in Godfrey. The differ-
ence between the two is not so great as to warrant a different outcome.41
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has never explicitly recog-
nized its obligation under Godfrey to apply narrowing constructions, it has
defined aggravated battery as "a battery which, qualitatively and quantita-
tively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act
of murder."42 The Supreme Court of Virginia's application of this narrow-
ing construction is inconsistent and arbitrary, and thus unconstitutional. By
applying the narrowing construction in this manner, the court, in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, fails to allow the narrowing
construction to serve its constitutional purpose.
To reconcile Hedrick with Godfrey and Reid, the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Hedrick expanded the time frame around the commission of the
offense to include the prior acts of rape, forcible oral sodomy and abduc-
35. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *7.
36. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 449.
37. Id. at 432-33.
38. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *7 (citing Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In a misstatement of the Godfrey facts that was revealing, though likely inadvertent,
the Hedrick court erroneously identified Godfrey's weapon as a rifle when, in actuality, the
weapon was a shotgun. Id.
42. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149. There are minimal, if any, definitions explicitly explain-
ing the prongs of aggravated battery, depravity of mind and torture within the vileness
aggravator. The definition for aggravated battery is the most comprehensive and may pass
muster if the court clarifies how it is to be applied at trial. The definition of depravity of
mind is just as vague as the term itself, and torture has no narrowing definition at all.
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tion.43 The court did not state specifically what made the murder in Hedrick
both "quantitatively and qualitatively more culpable than the minimum
necessary to commit murder."" The court seems to roll together the
concepts of "qualitatively and quantitatively" to include acts separate and
distinct from the actual murder in order to determine that the petitioner
committed aggravated battery within the statutory definition and it's pur-
portedly narrowing construction.45 In light of this analysis, it seems the
narrowing construction has no meaningful effect and virtually any murder
could ultimately qualify as aggravated battery.
B. Notice and Opportunity to Defend
The Supreme Court of Virginia's revelation for the first time on appeal
of the conduct it considered supportive of aggravated battery reveals another
aspect of its inconsistent application of the vileness factor. The aggravating
factor is an element the state must prove to render an accused eligible for
death.46 Hedrick's eligibility for death must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt before it can even be considered as a possible sentence.4" The Com-
monwealth has two options for proving death eligibility.48 The first option
seeks to prove that the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman" in nature (vileness factor), and the second is to prove that the
defendant poses a "continuing serious threat to society" (future dangerous-
ness factor).49 Because a defendant in Virginia is not eligible for death absent
a finding of vileness or future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, the
component prong of vileness on which the Commonwealth chooses to rest
its case becomes an element of its case for death. In Simmons v. South
Carolina" and Gardner v. Florida,51 the United States Supreme Court
applied the principle that a defendant has a due process right to deny or
explain the state's case for death.52 If a capital murder indictment does not
identify whether the Commonwealth plans to show vileness or future
dangerousness in proving its case for death, the defendant can not prepare
an effective defense against the Commonwealth's effort to prove its case for
43. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *7.
44. I
45. Id.
46. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1998).
47. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998).
48. Id.
49. IL
50. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (noting that the defendant has a due process right to deny or
explain the charges against him).
51. 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding that an individual shall not be sentenced to death on
the basis of evidence or information he had no opportunity to deny or explain).
52. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161-62; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
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death. Furthermore, if the Commonwealth chooses to assert that the
defendant is eligible for death because the offense was outrageously vile, it
must also state in the indictment or otherwise give notice of which compo-
nent of the vileness factor it plans to assert at trial as well as the narrowing
construction of that component.
If such information is not contained in the indictment, or communi-
cated in some other manner, the Commonwealth has not given the defen-
dant the requisite notice as to how it will prove its case for death. Conse-
quently, the defendant is denied the ability to defend the case against him.
The defendant has a due process right to deny and to explain the state's
evidence against him. Denial of this right violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
Hedrick's indictment contained nothing about aggravating factors. The
court in Hedrick also denied the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars
which was directed at learning which factor and prong the Commonwealth
intended to assert at trial to prove its case for death, including what evidence
the Commonwealth considered relevant to vileness.54 Therefore, Hedrick
was completely in the dark as to the state's case for death until the Supreme
Court of Virginia issued its opinion, at which point he could not defend
himself.
IV Conclusion
Defense counsel should continue to raise and preserve, on state and
federal constitutional grounds, the issue that unlawful trial by ambush is the
frustrating reality of the application of the aggravated battery factors for
death in Virginia.
Kelly E. P. Bennett
53. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 154; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 349.
54. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *5.
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